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The states that cried bear? 
An assessment of Russia’s deniable intervention  
as a regional threat   
 
“War is never inevitable, though the belief that it is can become one of its causes.” 
-Joseph S. Nye 
 
Introduction 
Russia’s involvement in Ukraine has been defined by many observers as hybrid warfare: a type 
of warfare “widely understood to blend conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular, and 
information and cyber warfare” (NATO, 2015a).1 Despite this conceptual opaqueness, hybrid 
warfare quickly became the threat du jour. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, for 
example, has stated that hybrid warfare is one of the key focuses of NATO and that the 
organization has to adapt to counter this threat (NATO, 2015b; BBC, 2015). Other European 
government officials, including Ministers of Foreign Affairs and high ranking military officers, 
have also made remarks to this extent (Rijksoverheid, 2014; IBTimes UK, 2015; Financial 
Times, 2015; Newsweek, 2015). Hybrid warfare is especially seen as a threat in the eastern 
European states in close geographical proximity to Russia. Many of these states are worried that 
Russia will use hybrid warfare to destabilize their countries as well. 
  Scholars and pundits have tried to define and conceptualize hybrid warfare (e.g. Bērziņš, 
2014; Galeotti, 2014, 2015; Rácz, 2015). Some have argued that its features are too unspecific to 
give the concept any applicability (e.g. Topychkanov, 2015).
2
 I concur in part with such 
critiques. Calling something ‘hybrid’ is often lazy academics. It allows one to enumerate all 
empirical characteristics of a phenomenon without making tough choices about what 
characteristics warrant emphasis and weight. Yet making those tough choices and providing 
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 With Russia’s strategy in Ukraine I refer to Russia’s military involvement in Crimea and the Donbas region. 
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 This lack of applicability is illustrated by the fact that Russia, Daesh, and Hezbollah, despite being very dissimilar, 
have all been described as hybrid threats. 
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clarity are exactly what scholars are supposed to do.  
  With this in mind I argue that Russia’s approach in Ukraine is best described as a 
deniable intervention. This deniability is achieved mainly through the use of irregular warfare, 
such as covert operations and support for local insurgents, but also through the use of biased, 
pro-Kremlin media. The primary goal of a deniable intervention is to destabilize the target state. 
I will extend on this in a subsequent chapter.  
 So far little attention has been given to the question if the prevailing threat perception (as 
mentioned in the first paragraph) is warranted. The construction or overestimation of external 
threat is known to be a powerful political motivator – the idea of rallying around the flag – and a 
key feature of a diversionary foreign policy (Smith, 1996, pp. 133-134). It is of vital importance 
to the assessment of foreign policy to examine the threat perception that underlies and motivates 
it. In other words, one should raise the question if the current estimation of the threat of Russia to 
the security of the region is accurate and legitimate or if the threat is under- or overestimated: 
 To what extent do other states neighboring Russia mirror the conditions that made 
Russia’s deniable intervention in Ukraine efficacious? 
By answering this question I seek not only to contribute to the debate on (the fallout of) the 
Ukraine crisis, but also to the academic literature dealing with Russian foreign policy. 
Furthermore, I seek to contribute to the general body of work on the Eurasian region by 
analyzing and clarifying what could become a regional phenomenon. Finally, answering this 
question will in a broader sense increase our knowledge of modern interstate conflict.  
 To answer the research question, I will employ a three-step approach that allows for a 
structured analysis of Russia’s strategy in Ukraine and what it means for the region: 
1. Conceptualizing ‘hybrid warfare’ as a deniable intervention; 
2. Identifying the (pre)conditions that allowed it to be efficacious in Ukraine; 
3. Determining whether these (pre)conditions are also present in other cases.  
There are four cases that I have selected for the analysis: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Kazakhstan. These have been selected in order to keep geographical proximity, which is an 
essential condition for a deniable intervention, relatively constant. All cases border Russia. Other 
than that, the cases are quite dissimilar, which I will discuss in more detail below.  
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  This thesis is structured as follows. First, I will discuss and criticize the concept of hybrid 
warfare by reviewing the literature on Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. After that, I will build 
on this literature by creating a theoretical framework in which I will define Russia’s involvement 
in Ukraine as a deniable intervention as well as outline the conditions central to this analysis. 
This theoretical framework will then be briefly operationalized. Finally, I will use this theoretical 
framework to assess whether or not the deniable intervention constitutes a region-wide security 
threat, by empirically analyzing the selected cases. 
Literature review 
As mentioned, one of the deficiencies of the concept hybrid warfare is that its catch-all 
characteristic dilutes its conceptual clearness. The definition mentioned in the introduction 
illustrates this problem: by stating that it blends all types of warfare ultimately leaves one empty- 
handed. Furthermore, defining hybrid warfare along the full spectrum of warfare without adding 
emphasis also means that it is not a new phenomenon (Topychkanov, 2015). Ruslan Pukhov, for 
example, has stated that hybrid warfare is “simply a modern application of an age-old set of 
military and political practices” (2015), while others argue that the novelty lies in the intensity 
and effective coordination of means (e.g. Rácz, 2015, p. 87). 
  On the offset it is important to understand to what these pundits refer when they write 
about practices and means. András Rácz (2015), for example, argues that hybrid warfare can be 
described as “being composed of three main phases, each of which is composed of three 
sections” (p. 57). In the preparatory phase Russia concentrates on the mapping of weaknesses, 
for which it draws upon the traditional toolbox of foreign policy. This toolbox consists of gaining 
economic influence, establishing networks of loyal NGO’s and gaining a significant media 
position (pp. 58-59). This media position is an important aspect. It allows one to influence the 
public debate, thereby creating a favorable environment for intervening. 
  Next is the attack phase, in which “open, organized, armed violence starts to occur” (p. 
60). An important feature of this violence is that it is carried out by ‘local protestors’ – although 
well-armed and exhibiting high tactical skills. Many of the local protestors in Crimea turned out 
to be Russian Special Forces (tenderly called ‘polite men’ in Russia) (Kremlin, 2014). 
   Finally, in the stabilization phase the locals are supposed to hold a referendum on 
independence/secession that will have lasting instability in the targeted state as result.  
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  Rácz’s three phase model can be criticized on several grounds. First, it assumes 
somewhat of a linear approach, in which means are deployed in a logical sequence.
3
 
Furthermore, within this linear approach there are three phases, nine sections, thirty ‘bullet 
points’ of action; which makes for a bulky framework. One can applaud Rácz’s effort to be as 
thorough as possible, but without differentiating in weight between these ‘bullet points’ the 
framework is very much an enumeration with, consequently, limited analytical applicability. 
  Secondly, gaining economic influence and creating dependencies should not be 
considered part of ‘a new type of warfare’. While economic coercion is not a big part of Rácz’s 
framework, it should not be in there at all. Economic coercion is a different instrument altogether 
and has been a pervasive aspect of Russian (and Eurasian) foreign policy for decades (Amineh, 
2003). Economic coercion has been used in the case of Ukraine as well, but for the sake of 
analytical clarity I argue that economic coercion happens alongside the deniable intervention 
central in this thesis. Both serve the same goal, namely destabilization of the targeted state. 
  Finally, some important elements of Russia’s involvement are missing from his extensive 
framework. The first element that is left out is providing arms to the separatists in the Donbas 
region. I argue that this is one of the defining features of Russia’s strategy. Instead, Rácz limits 
the role of the regular armed forces (excluding Special Forces) to “presenting an imminent 
threat” (p. 63) by posing on the border. Yet this threat came effectively into force when these 
troops started supplying arms and supplies across the border. 
  Considering the goals Russia wants to attain in Ukraine, it is not surprising that it chose 
to engage in what is sometimes called a proxy war (e.g. Bar-Siman-Tov, 1984). Idean Salehyan 
et al (2011) argue that “sponsoring a rebel organization is a tactic that states use to destabilize 
target governments” (p.  712). Not only is providing support to local insurgents less costly than 
direct interstate war, it also allows states to “plausibly deny complicity” (ibid., p. 713). The 
argument that “governments may have an incentive to hide acts of foreign aggression” (ibid.) is 
well-suited in explaining parts of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine.  
  In addition, transnational kin is an important explanatorum in external state support for 
local insurgencies (ibid., p. 729). Transnational ethnic linkages ease the process of cooperation, 
because locals are less likely to fear divergent interests, while the supporting states can exercise 
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 This linear approach does not fare well with hybrid warfare considering the latter is sometimes referred to as non-
linear warfare, which is an equally problematic concept: there is no such phenomenon as a linear war.   
6 
 
more control, thereby reducing the risk of agency slack (Salehyan, 2010, p. 509). It is also 
important to note in this regard that transnational ethnic linkages tend to increase both the 
likelihood of conflict breaking out (Cederman et al, 2009, p. 432) as the duration of the conflict 
(Cunninham, 2010, p. 125). As I will argue, media play an important part in fueling these 
transnational ethnic linkages, especially in the case of Russia and Ukraine. 
  The second element in Rácz’s framework that is not adequately specified is the legal 
scheme of Russia’s involvement. The main feature of this scheme is that Russia claims its 
actions are democratic and/or in accordance with (international) legislature while the opposite is 
more accurate. Heidi Reisinger and Aleksandr Golts (2014) talk about “actions with the 
appearance of legality” (p. 3), such as the Russian State Duma’s authorization to use armed 
forces (while Russia is officially not a party to the conflict) and the Crimean referendum 
(claiming to represent the will of the people but not meeting international standards). Elizabeth 
Cullen Dunn and Michael Bobick (2014) put it eloquently when they state that “Vladimir Putin 
satirizes the moral and legal arguments used by Western states to justify their own international 
intervention” (p. 405). Russia uses concepts such as humanitarian aid to provide arms and self-
determination to justify occupying sovereign territory. 
  Roy Allison (2014) summarizes the appearance of legality as follows: “As the crisis 
escalated, Russia drew on legal rhetoric to assist the process of ‘deniable’ intervention. This 
aimed to blur the legal and illegal, to create justificatory smokescreens, in part by exploiting 
some areas of uncertainty in international law, while making unfounded assertions of ‘facts’ 
(especially ostensible threats to Russians and Russian-speakers). The justifications Russia 
offered for its actions exploited grey areas and flux in legal and normative development as well 
as playing back to western states their own liberal discourse” (p. 1259). One paradox in all of 
this is of course that Russia denies being involved yet argues with legal arguments it is allowed 
to be involved. I will adopt Allison’s concept of deniable intervention. 
  So far I have discussed hybrid warfare or the deniable intervention in terms of the 
characteristics several authors have mentioned. The question then becomes what structural 
conditions provide fertile ground for such a strategy to work. Rácz provides some helpful 
insights in this regard by mentioning six conditions.  
  The first is that Russia has to be military superior to the targeted state (p. 74). Without 
military superiority the irregular forces will be destroyed. The second condition focuses on 
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logistics: “there either has to be a Russian military presence in the target region, as was the case 
in Crimea, or the region in question has to have a common border with Russia, with either a 
weak or non-existent border-guard service, as was the case in Eastern Ukraine” (pp. 82-83). In 
other words, a deniable intervention is only possible in those states that are in close geographical 
proximity. The third condition is that there has to be a strong media presence in the targeted state 
and in the international community (p. 81). This will obscure and confuse the public debate and 
provide well-chosen narratives that support the political objectives. 
  The other three conditions focus on the targeted state. The fourth condition is that there 
has to be weak central power and security structures. According to Rácz, only a “a well-
functioning, strong state administration, together with its police and secret services, is able to 
quickly uncover and suppress [hostile] activities emanating from abroad” (p. 76). This condition 
seems to be somewhat overlapping with the first one mentioned (military superiority). Others 
have noted that state capacity is a key variable whether or not a state is ‘contaminated’ by civil 
war in neighboring states (Braithwaite, 2010, p. 317).  
  The fifth condition is that there has to be “be a lasting, regionally-concentrated 
dissatisfaction with the central government, preferably with an inherent ethnic or separatism-
related element” (p. 78). Such dissatisfaction can be exploited, especially by appealing to the 
ethnic linkage mentioned a few paragraphs above. The sixth and final condition also focuses on 
the transnational linkage: the presence of a Russian-speaking minority (pp. 80-81). Such 
minorities provide the legitimization of intervening abroad and form a strong basis for a local 
insurgency.  
  In sum, many authors have tried to make sense of Russia’s strategy in Ukraine. Some 
have argued that the concept ‘hybrid warfare’ should be used in this regard, while others have 
focused on the legal aspects of Russia’s intervention. I have argued that some aspects, such as 
the support for local insurgents, have been addressed elsewhere in more detail and are suitable to 
apply on the case of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. In the next section I will build on this 
literature review and bring all the different pieces discussed so far together in one theoretical 
framework. 
 
 
8 
 
Conceptualizing Russia’s involvement in Ukraine: a deniable intervention 
In this section I will outline the theoretical framework that provides the basis for the empirical 
analysis below. The framework is based upon the discussed literature, especially on Rácz (2014), 
Allison (2015) and Salehyan et al (2011). First I will conceptualize the deniable intervention. 
After that I will specify the conditions I think are critical for such an intervention to work. 
Deniable intervention 
The deniable intervention can be defined as a military intervention by a state using covert forces 
as well as local insurgents, which have been catechized through pro-Kremlin media, to 
destabilize an adversary state and allow the intervening state deniability of involvement.  
  With covert forces I refer to the use of the so-called ‘little green men’, whom were, 
according to Mr. Putin, “"self-defence groups" organised by [Crimean] locals who bought all 
their uniforms and hardware in a shop” (BBC, 2014), but turned out to be Russian Special Forces 
(Kremlin, 2014). Deniability was achieved through the fact that these forces did not wear any 
clear insignia or emblems by which they could be identified as Russian forces (which constitutes 
a clear violation of international law as outlined in the Geneva Conventions, of which Russia is a 
signatory). Such covert operations have continued in the Donbas region. Russian armed forces 
are operating alongside the separatists while officials deny their involvement and call these 
forces ‘volunteers’: Russian nationals joining the war on their own without any government 
involvement (Foreign Policy, 2015; New York Times, 2015). 
  The second component of the deniable intervention is the use of and support for local 
insurgents. As Salehyan et al. (2011, pp. 712-713) argue, fighting an adversary through 
insurgents is less costly and allows one to hide foreign aggression. The insurgents in the Donbas 
region have formed numerous militia groups commonly referred to by the umbrella term United 
Armed Forces of Novorossiya (NAF) (TASS, 2014).
4
 Russia has been supplying the NAF with 
numerous weapons, including anti-aircraft guns (such as the BUK missile system used to down 
Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17), battle tanks, and heavy artillery (see ARES, 2014). Without 
the Russian supplies the insurgents would not have been able to make their stance. The alliance 
between insurgents and state is thus beneficial to both: the insurgents in the Donbas region 
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 Here I should mention that the NAF is neither as united nor organized as the name would suggest and that the 
name is to a large degree used to legitimize the separatist regimes.  
9 
 
increase their fighting chance (see also Byman et al, 2001, p. 10), while the intervening state, 
Russia, is able to deny its involvement in the conflict. 
  In many cases of external state support for insurgents, the grievances that give rise to an 
insurgency exist anterior to receiving support. In other words, states play a reactive role by 
responding to an existing situation. In Ukraine, however, the situation is more complex than that. 
Russia has played an active, perhaps even decisive, role by creating and fueling the grievances 
that underlie the insurgency. It has done so through the use of state-controlled, biased media. 
According to Peter Pomerantsev (2014b), “Putin’s Russia cares very much about ideas, carefully 
controlling media, education, and parties inside the country and investing hundreds of millions of 
dollars in international broadcasting, intellectual influencers, and think tanks abroad”. Russia 
understands the critical role information plays before, during, and after conflict.
5
 
  In Ukraine this meant promoting the narrative that the Euromaidan revolution was run by 
fascists and that the new government in Kiev also consisted of fascist parties. Other parts of the 
narrative were that leading protestors of the Euromaidan were involved in the killing of 
compatriots (for example during the riots in February 2014) and that American tanks were being 
used to overthrow (what was referred to as) the legitimate government. Such narratives, 
presented by leading media channels such as RT and spread all over the internet, created anger 
and grievance over the new post-Euromaidan situation, which proved to be fertile ground for 
Russia to start its deniable intervention. Once the deniable intervention had begun, Russia 
imposed an ‘information blockade’ (Johnston, 2015, p. 2) by isolating the locals from 
international media. In both Crimea and the Donbas region armed forces quickly captured 
television transmission stations and replaced all Ukrainian and international stations with biased 
Russian media. In short, Russian state-controlled media play a decisive role in creating and 
fueling the grievances, thereby prolonging the conflict.
6
 
Conditions critical for the deniable intervention 
The deniable intervention thus has three major components: covert operations, support for local 
insurgents, and dominant, biased media. From these three components the conditions that have 
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 Other states, including Ukraine, also understand this crucial role and are promoting their own narratives. Russia is 
therefore not the only state active in informational campaigns. 
6
 There is also an international part to the media strategy of Russia meant to confuse the international environment. 
This part draws heavily on the legal rhetoric mentioned by Allison (2014) and Dunn & Bobick (2014).  
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an effect on the efficaciousness of the deniable intervention can be deducted. These conditions 
will form the basis for the empirical analysis and can thus be considered the hypotheses that will 
be tested. I have summarized them in table 1.  
 It has to be noted first, however, that Russia cannot be bogged down in other major 
conflicts. Military capacity will probably not be the biggest issue here, considering the relatively 
small investment the deniable intervention requires. But it will require other resources, most 
significantly on the political domain. It is extremely difficult to fight multiple wars at once, and 
the Kremlin will likely do anything to avoid this.
7
 This analysis will be built on the hypothetical 
assumption that Russia is not involved in other major conflicts and will therefore have (political) 
capacity available for a deniable intervention. 
 Table 1. Conditions that affect the chances of the deniable intervention
8
 
1 Russia has an geopolitical incentive to destabilize the targeted state 
2 Weak state capacity in targeted state    
3 Russian minorities in targeted state 
4 Strong pro-Kremlin media presence in targeted state 
The first condition is that Russia has to have an incentive to destabilize the targeted state. In 
Ukraine, just as in Georgia in 2008, the incentive for Russia was the imminent strengthening of 
the relationship between these states and Western institutions such as the EU and NATO. 
Without such an incentive, Russia will not commit to a policy for which it will be vilified by the 
international community - it has to be worth it. Considering Russia’s actions in the past, the most 
likely incentives involve Russia losing influence in a neighboring state, which reduces Russia’s 
regional power, and/or other actors, such as the EU and NATO, strengthening their relationship 
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 This is already apparent at the time of writing in the case of Ukraine, where Russia has been more willing to 
cooperate and enforce the Minsk agreement since it increased its presence in Syria. Considering that Russia is thus 
heavily invested in other conflicts for at least the next six months, another deniable intervention will be very 
unlikely on the short term. This thesis, however, is not focused on the short term, but on the structural factors that 
will remain present on the long term. 
8
 Another condition is favorable logistics: Russia must be able to transport forces and arms quickly and unnoticed. 
Shared borders are therefore imperative. Considering my case-selection strategy, in which I have held geographical 
proximity constant, this condition will not yield any differences between the cases and has therefore been left out of 
the framework.  
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with neighboring states.
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  The second condition is that the targeted state must have weak central power and weak 
security structures. If a state is strong and has a good functioning military able to conduct 
missions throughout its territory, it will be able to a) resist and counter the covert operations, and 
b) secure the border to limit arms supplies to (would-be) insurgents. I will conceptualize this in 
terms of state capacity, which refers to the “endogenous resources that a state possesses that can 
be mobilized to deal with emergencies” (Braithwaite, 2010, p. 313). The deniable intervention in 
Ukraine was to some degree made possible by the tumult Ukraine was facing after the 
revolution, the ousting of the president, and the restructuring of state institutions. The new 
leadership proved unable to withstand Russian aggression. 
  The third condition is the presence in the targeted state of minorities who identify 
themselves as ethnically Russian.
10
 Preferably these minorities are grouped together in the same 
region. Geographical concentration increases the possibilities for organization and gaining the 
upper hand. These groups are necessary in order to form an insurgency through which Russia can 
destabilize the targeted state. Theoretically, the insurgents do not have to be Russian: the main 
criterion is that they are willing to fight against the central government. But as Salehyan (2010, 
p. 509) points out, ethnic linkage increases the chances of cooperation between locals and the 
‘kin-state’. Furthermore, the linkage is necessary in order to use the legal rhetoric of ‘protecting 
our people abroad’ which forms the main justification, both on the international and the domestic 
level, for the deniable intervention. 
   The fourth condition is that pro-Kremlin media should have a strong position in the 
targeted state. As mentioned, biased media are important because they catechize the locals and 
fuel grievances that can lead to an insurgency. Through the use of biased media Russia can 
exploit dissatisfaction. More generally, biased media also offer a narrative of the world and the 
region that suits the Kremlin. Having a dominant position in the media landscape gives Russia 
the ability to drone out any competing narratives from international and independent media. 
  Two of the conditions mentioned by Rácz I have omitted. Military superiority is left out 
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 The idea that losing grip or influence in another state is one of the most powerful incentives is based on prospect 
theory, which states that losses loom larger than gains and that loss aversion leads to risk-seeking behavior 
(Kahnemann, 2011, p. 283). 
10
 I have chosen to focus on ethnicity rather than language when discussing the ‘Russian minorities’. A shared 
ethnicity often provides a stronger bond than language alone. Furthermore, by focusing on ethnicity I can exempt 
myself from the conceptual quagmire that is the first language/second language debate, which could trouble and 
obfuscate analysis.  
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of the analysis because it overlaps too much with the condition focused on security structures. 
Furthermore, regional dissatisfaction is not included because it cannot be sensibly disentangled 
from the Russian biased media condition. 
   In this section I have defined Russia’s involvement in Ukraine as a deniable intervention, 
which focuses on covert operations, state support for insurgents, and biased media. Building on 
this definition, I have identified four conditions with a critical effect on the possibility and 
efficaciousness of the deniable intervention.  
Operationalization 
In this section I will briefly outline and clarify the operationalization of the empirical analysis. 
This operationalization consists of the case selection strategy, the methodology, and the data 
sources I will rely on for the analysis. 
Case selection strategy 
The cases I have selected for analysis are: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan. As 
mentioned, close proximity to Russia is one of the criteria on which I have selected the cases. All 
cases border Russia. This is a necessary condition for logistical reasons and the condition most 
easily kept constant across cases. Apart from that, the cases can be divided into two camps. 
  The first camp consists of Estonia and Latvia. These two states are both democracies and 
possess membership of NATO and the EU. They have thus aligned themselves firmly with the 
rest of Europe and with the US. Membership of NATO is especially an interesting factor 
considering Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that “an armed attack against one 
or more of them [members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all (…)” (NATO, 2008). While a deniable intervention is of course an armed attack, it is 
hardly the kind of attack the signatories of the treaty in 1949 had in mind. NATO is meant as 
deterrence, yet little is known about deterrence against irregular types of warfare and 
insurgencies. Furthermore, Estonian and Latvian concerns about Russia’s involvement in 
Ukraine have led to an increase of NATO presence in the region. As mentioned above, it is 
necessary to examine whether their concerns are based on empirical logic.  
  The second camp consists of Belarus and Kazakhstan. These states have aligned 
themselves with Russia. They are not members of EU or NATO. Instead, they have opted to 
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become part of the Russian-led Eurasian Union. Belarus and Kazakhstan also conduct joint 
military exercises with Russia. Furthermore, they are both not democratic. According to the 
Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit, Belarus and Kazakhstan are authoritarian 
regimes of the same category as Russia (EIU, 2014). This second camp is led by Russian-backed 
presidents known for their disregard for democratic values, which reminisces one of the situation 
in Ukraine before the Euromaidan revolution. 
  There are states not included in this analysis that would be interesting for a subsequent 
project. Armenia and Azerbaijan, for instance, also share a border with Russia. Similar to, for 
example, Belarus and pre-Euromaidan Ukraine, Armenia is very close to Russia. Other 
interesting cases would be Moldova and/or Kyrgyzstan, which have to deal with extensive 
Russian influence. These cases have not been included in this analysis in order to keep this 
project viable and allow for an in-depth analysis of the cases that are selected. 
Methods and data 
The method I will use in this analysis is what Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) call 
a structured, focused comparison. This “method is “structured" in that the researcher writes 
general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each 
case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison 
and cumulation of the findings  of the cases possible. The method is “focused" in that it deals 
only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined” (p. 67). Applied to this thesis, the 
analysis is structured by the four conditions outlined above and focused on the aspects dealing 
with the deniable intervention. 
  As Jonathan Hopkin (2010) states, “comparison across several cases (usually countries) 
enables the researcher to assess whether a particular political phenomenon is simply a local issue 
or a broader trend” (Hopkin in Marsh & Stoker, 2010, p. 285). I apply the same logic, except I 
am concerned with a hypothesized broader trend, namely the possibility of a deniable 
intervention in another state. Furthermore, comparisons are often used to test and develop theory. 
Unfortunately from an academic perspective, there are no other cases of deniable interventions as 
defined above, which makes theory testing not possible. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is a 
preliminary exploration of the subject at hand by analyzing whether the conditions that are 
critical for a deniable intervention are present in the region, or, in other words, whether the 
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deniable intervention could develop into a wider phenomenon (from n=1 to n>1). 
  Based on the conditions identified above, the analysis requires data on state capacity, 
ethnic minorities and Russian media in the selected cases, as well as on the relationship between 
Russia and the selected cases to determine whether or not there is an incentive to intervene. 
  Data on state capacity will be drawn first of all from the relative political capacity (RPC) 
dataset v2.1 (available at Dataverse, 2015). The RPC dataset “can be considered akin to a 
measure of the relative success of the government in extracting resources. It is calculated as the 
ratio of the total value of actual extractions to the predicted value of extractions” (Braithwaite, 
2010, p. 315). Tax extraction is such a good indicator because “to mobilize and extract financial 
resources is the core of state capacity and the foundation for the state’s ability to realize its other 
capacities” (Wang and Hu, 2001, p. 27). In other words, the extraction of resources is the 
prerequisite for other state functions, e.g. the monopoly on violence through military and police. 
I will use data provided by the second model of the RPC dataset, considering all cases are more 
or less developed societies.  
  The RPC dataset is, however, not perfect. Some aspects, such as the loyalty or skill level 
of officials, are ignored, as is the size of the ‘shadow economy’, which is a pervasive aspect of 
post-Soviet economies. I will therefore supplement this dataset with a) data on corruption, 
derived from organizations such as Transparency International, and b) secondary sources, which 
provide a more in-depth analysis of the specifics of each single case. 
  Data on the ethnic minorities will come to some degree from the set build by the 
Minorities at Risk Project (MAR). MAR “focuses specifically on ethnopolitical groups [and] 
non-state communal groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary world because 
of their status and political actions” (MAR, 2014). MAR has extensive data on the ethnic 
minorities in all the selected cases. I will also use censuses, such as the 2009 census in Belarus 
(Belstat, 2014), and secondary sources, such as Katja Koort (2014) and Marina Best (2013).  
  For data on pro-Kremlin media in the cases I will build on work by the European 
Journalism Centre (EJC), which provides extensive analyses of the media landscapes in the 
selected cases (EJC, 2015). There has also been some research on Russia’s soft power in terms of 
media presence abroad (e.g. Szostek, 2015; Luhn, 2015), which I will use to supplement the EJC 
data. A report made for the Center for International Media Assistance by David Satter (2014) on 
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Russia’s control over media in the former Soviet states will especially be used in this regard.11   
  Finally, for the relationship between Russia and the cases I will draw mostly from 
secondary sources that have analyzed Russian foreign policy. These analyses will provide me 
with insight on whether there is any incentive for Russia to intervene in the particular case by 
looking at the international dynamics. Sources I will look at are, for example, Kuchins & 
Zevelev (2012), Monaghan (2013), Frear (2013), Bieliszczuk (2015), Muižnieks (2006), and 
Ambrosio (2006).  
Empirical section 
Belarus 
Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko called the annexation of Crimea a “bad precedent” 
and hosted peace talks between Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France in Minsk in order to solve 
the conflict in eastern Ukraine (Moscow Times, 2014). Such a constructive approach also forms 
the basis for Belarus’ relation with Russia, which has resulted in a firm position in the Russian 
sphere of influence. As the subsequent analysis shows, this close relationship is the most 
alarming factor in terms of a possibility of a deniable intervention. On state capacity, the position 
of ethnic Russians in Belarus, and the influence of Russian media, Belarus scores relatively well.  
Belarus-Russia relations  
Of the four cases discussed in this study, Belarus has remained the closest to Russia after the end 
of the Soviet-Union. In the 1990s, the two states expressed their close relationship through the 
formation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, another political-economic union intended to 
fill the gaps left by the dissolution of the Soviet-Union.  
  According to Steven Eke and Taras Kuzio (2000), this union meant that Belarus 
continued “to tread a difficult path between rejection of the consequences of independence and 
sovereignty on the one hand and the paradox of trying to preserve that independent status within 
a new or renewed (con)federation on the other” (p. 523). For Russia, the Union was one of the 
first defensive mechanisms devised to counter the influence of the European Union (Ambrosio, 
                                                             
11
 I will focus primarily on traditional media as television and printed. While digital media are gaining prominence 
and notoriety when it comes to Russian soft power, they are also more diffuse and therefore more difficult to 
analyze with precision. One example that is valid for all four cases is Sputnik News. While it is often noted that this 
outlet is one of the key components of Russia’s international media strategy, there is no data available on its reach 
and if users perceive it as trustworthy.  
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2006, p. 408). The uneasy equilibrium between sovereignty and a very close relation with Russia 
has remained one of the defining features of Belarus throughout the last two decades. 
  One of the effects of the close relationship Belarus maintains with Russia is dependency. 
According to Balász Jarábik (2014), subsidies from Russia make up 10-15 percent of Belarus’ 
GDP. These subsidies consist largely of favorable gas prices, resulting in the lowest gas price in 
the region – upwards of 50% less compared to the prices in Ukraine and Poland (2013) 
(Alachnovič, 2015). The same dynamics can be seen when it comes to oil (ibid.). Such subsidies 
prevent Belarus from reforming and diversifying its energy imports; the price divergence 
compared to the world markets is simply too big to give serious consideration. 
  In exchange for the preferential position on the economic domain, Belarus has closely 
linked itself with Russia when it comes to international politics. It is a member of nearly all the 
Russian-led regional initiatives, including the most recent Eurasian Economic Union. As 
Matthew Frear (2013) argues, Belarus has taken a “highly instrumental approach” to these 
initiatives, in which “the primary goal has not been integration per se, but rather securing 
beneficial deals from Russia, in particular on the energy front” (p. 119). A result of this 
instrumental approach is that Belarus has not been afraid to dig its heels in or flirt openly with 
the European Union in order to accomplish a better deal with Russia. 
  Russia, on its part, also depends to some degree on Belarus, especially when it comes to 
developing these regional initiatives and preventing the European Union from knocking on the 
Russian border. This has led the Kremlin to protect the Belarusian regime from any kind of 
threat it faces, for example during the period in which the so-called color revolutions were 
prevalent throughout the Eurasian region (Ambrosio, 2006, p. 424). This strokes with the general 
notion that Russia supports “incumbent autocrats in cases where pro-Russia politicians 
dominate” (Way, 2015, p. 691), and further increases Belarus’ dependency on Russia. 
  Russia’s support for pro-Russia autocrats means that it will try and prevent the ousting of 
friendly regimes. Therefore, if democratic and pro-Europe forces gain the upper hand in Belarus 
and eliminate its regime, similar to what happened in Ukraine in 2014, it is very unlikely that 
Russia would stand idly by. Instead, it is likely that Russia will at the very least contemplate a 
deniable intervention in order to a) destabilize and delegitimize the new regime and b) prevent 
Belarus from aligning itself with the European Union. 
  This is one of the central arguments throughout this thesis: Those states that have close 
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relations with Russia run higher risk of falling victim to a deniable intervention in case of regime 
chance (i.e. Belarus and Kazakhstan) than those states with antagonistic relations with Russia 
(i.e. the Baltics). This is because the former, while least likely to be lost as a partner, will 
constitute the highest loss, especially in terms of prestige. Such dynamics can be witnessed in the 
case of Ukraine, which had aligned itself closely with Russia under Viktor Yanukovych. 
  At the moment, however, there is no indication that regime chance in Belarus is about to 
happen. In fact, some commentators have argued that the Lukashenko regime has been 
strengthened by the crisis in Ukraine (e.g. Bloomberg, 2014a). It has shown the grave 
consequences of regime change and the crisis the process of democratization can induce, thereby 
silencing some of the opponents of the regime who have advocated democracy and the ousting of 
Lukashenko in the past. Lukashenko, on his part, has continued to tread the difficult path 
between sovereignty and dependence in his reaction to the annexation of Crimea. He criticized 
Russia for its action, stating that it sets “a bad precedent” and that Ukraine should remain “a 
single, indivisible, integral, nonbloc state” (Moscow Times, 2014; Bloomberg, 2014a). In the 
same breath, however, he argued that Ukraine provoked the actions of Russia and that Crimea is 
now “de facto part of Russia”, whether we accept it or not (ibid.). 
  The close relation between Russia and Belarus thus means that there is currently no 
geopolitical incentive for Russia to intervene in Belarus. Despite some flirtation with the West, 
Belarus is firmly placed in the Russian sphere of influence. Future regime change could lead to a 
deniable intervention: Russia has shown it will fight any potential loss of influence and prestige. 
At the moment, however, regime change is not very likely. 
Belarusian state capacity 
As mentioned in the operationalization section, state capacity is measured here by “the ability of 
governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals” 
(TransResearch Consortium, 2013). Belarus scores relatively high in the RPC dataset with a 
score of 1.287 in 2011. This score is down significantly since 2008 (2.156), presumably because 
of a chance in taxation legislature. Compared to the other cases in this study, Belarus has the 
second-highest score, behind Kazakhstan. Several authors have noted that Belarus has one of the 
strongest state apparatuses in the post-Soviet region (Way, 2005, p. 247; Fortin, 2010, p. 674). 
  One of the rationales for the high state capacity of Belarus is the authoritarian political 
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regime. Compared to democracies, like the ones in Estonia and Latvia, the Belarusian regime is 
less concerned with legitimizing state policies to other political and judicial bodies. Furthermore, 
authoritarian regimes in general tend to “operate in stable and viable political environments” 
(Fortin, 2010, p. 678), which increases the capacity to effectively extract resources from the 
national output. This contrasts with relatively unstable democracies, which have been myriad in 
the region since the end of the Soviet-Union, most notably in Ukraine in the last decade or so. 
Finally, an authoritarian regime tends to spend more resources on security in order to be able to 
repress dissident voices and other threats to the regime. The effect of such prioritization is not 
only an increase in internal, coercive capacity, but also in capacity to resist external threats. 
  Another rationale for the high state capacity in Belarus follows the above but concerns 
itself with the economy. The Belarusian government controls over seventy percent of the 
national economy (Jarábik, 2014). Unlike other post-Soviet states, like Ukraine and Russia, 
Belarus did not embark on extensive privatization programs in the 1990s. This has prevented the 
emergence of a) a strong political opposition and b) a class of oligarchs (see Way, 2005, p. 250). 
Central authority in the economy therefore remains all but omnipotent, which makes extraction 
of resources straightforward. This further explains the high state capacity in Belarus. 
  While the declining score since 2008 indicates that state capacity has been reduced, it is 
unlikely that there will be a significant drop in the coming years. The Lukashenko regime is 
firmly in place, as exhibited by recent election results (which are interesting not as an indication 
of popular support but of political control). Although some have argued that Belarus is opening 
up its economy and relying more on private businesses (e.g. Jarábik, 2014), its main economic 
characteristics, namely vast state control, rent-seeking behavior, and an overreliance on Russia, 
are not up for debate and will remain in place for the foreseeable future. The political and 
economic dimensions thus indicate that Belarus’ high state capacity is likely to abide.  
  One caveat has to be made in regard to Belarus’ state capacity. While Belarus scores high 
on the ability to extract resources, which is the indicator for state capacity in this study, it 
“exhibits high levels of corruption, inadequate protection of property rights and almost no 
infrastructure reform (…) these indicators reveal that Belarus’ state is only strong in certain 
areas, while it is weak in others” (Fortin, 2010, pp. 667-669; also TI, 2014). Corruption 
diminishes state capacity by reducing the total amount of revenue a state receives, which curtails 
the ability to perform all necessary state functions. As ever in scientific research, a lot thus 
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depends on the conceptualization and measurements one chooses to use.  
  Nevertheless, the analysis and data from the RPC dataset show that Belarus scores 1.287 
when it comes to state capacity, which is a relatively high score. As mentioned above, a state 
with a high capacity will be better able to resist the covert operations used in a deniable 
intervention and to secure the borders to prevent support for insurgents from flowing in. This 
means that, in short, Belarus will be better able to resist a deniable intervention than Ukraine did 
in the last two years. 
Ethnic Russians in Belarus 
The latest census (2009) shows that there are 785.000 people living in Belarus that identify 
themselves as ethnic Russian. This constitutes approximately 8.3 percent of the total population 
of Belarus, making Russians the largest minority, in front of Poles (3 percent) (IHSN, 2014). 
Belarusians make up around 84 percent of the population (ibid). The relative and absolute size of 
the Russian minority has decreased since the previous census of 1999, in which 11.4 percent of 
the population, or 1.1 million people, stated to be ethnic Russian (Belstat, 2014). The decrease in 
ethnic Russians is larger than the general population decline in Belarus in the same period. It is 
not clear if the steep decline is due to migration to, for example, Russia, or due to assimilation – 
which would mean that some ethnic Russians now identify themselves as being Belarusian. 
  According to data from MAR, Russians living in Belarus are not geographically 
concentrated. Instead, they are dispersed throughout the country, with Minsk City (184.000) and 
the region of Vitebsk in the eastern part of Belarus (125.000) having the largest shares (IHSN, 
2014). Russians, however, do not form the majority in any of the regions of Belarus. 
  Furthermore, Russians “continue to be the advantaged minority” in Belarus (MAR, 
2015c). Unlike Estonia and Latvia, where the new authorities adopted harsh nationalization 
policies in the 1990s, Belarus remained entwined with Russia, and many Belarusians still 
identify themselves closely with Russia (ibid.). Because of this friendly attitude of Belarus 
towards Russia, Russians are not discriminated against in any way and it is therefore very 
unlikely that they will rebel or even protest against the Belarusian government.  
  Instead, it is more likely that other groups in Belarusian society, particularly those that 
advocate closer relations with Europe, will protest against the government. There have been 
protests by these pro-Western groups during the last decade (most notably in 2006 and 2011), but 
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these have not led to any significant change that might have inspired pro-Russia groups to start 
campaigns of their own and in support of the pro-Russia government. There are no indicators 
that a large scale protest like the one in Ukraine in 2014 is likely to happen in Belarus. 
  The Russian minority in Belarus thus exhibits no signs of grievances against the 
Belarusian state. It continues to have an advantageous position in society. The minority is also 
geographically dispersed. These factors limit the potential for a deniable intervention if Russia 
would decide to intervene in Belarus.  
Pro-Kremlin media in Belarus 
Media is to a large degree controlled by the Belarusian regime (EJC, 2015d). Belarus is ranked 
157
th
 of 180 countries investigated in the 2015 World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2015). In the 
2015 Freedom of the Press analysis by the Freedom House, Belarus scored an abysmal 93/100 in 
terms of press freedom (with 100 being the worst possible score) (Freedom House, 2015a). This 
means that there is little to no independent media present and that the population depends on 
biased reporting.  
  Yet the extensive state control also means that the Belarusian regime has the opportunity 
to prevent and/or counter Russian influence in the media domain. As Szostek (2015) argues: “No 
media outlet in Belarus can function without an ofﬁcial licence and the state has the power to 
suspend or terminate the operations of any publisher or broadcaster, essentially at will” (p. 124). 
This results in the possibility to end any rousing activities before they begin. 
  The good relationship between Belarus and Russia is also present in the media domain, 
with politicians on both sides championing a ‘single information space’ and the exchange of 
news across borders (e.g. Minsvyaz, 2015). This means that most Russian media have access to 
the Belarusian public and are present in terms of newspapers, tabloids, and television 
programmes (see Szostek, 2015, p. 124 for an overview of Russian involvement in Belarus’ 
media landscape; also EJC, 2015d). Most Belarusian television channels depend on content from 
counterparts controlled by the Russian state. 
  For Russia, the ‘single information space’ and the involvement in the Belarusian media 
domain serve not only to strengthen the relationship between Belarusians and Russians, but also 
to prevent the Belarusian regime from going astray: “Criticism on Russian television is 
invariably used as a means of putting pressure on [Lukashenko]” (Satter, 2014, p. 31). Reports 
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coming from Russian media can be critical of the Belarusian regime, which has led some 
channels to lose their accreditation in the past and others to be silenced otherwise. 
  However, the Belarusian regime has learned from such incidents and adopted practices 
that limit the impact of critical reports, simply by removing them: “All of the Russian programs 
shown in Belarus are rebroadcast after a one-hour delay, which allows Minsk to censor and 
replace any material critical of Belarus or its government” (ibid.). In other words, the Belarusian 
regime is able to manage the Russian media in Belarus, thereby preventing the dispersion of 
information or stories that could harm the regime. This allows the regime to thwart any attempts 
to catechize the local Russian minority and fuel grievances. 
  While Russia and Belarus thus claim to strive to a ‘single information space’, there is 
distrust on both sides of the border. The Belarusian regime sees control of the media as vital to 
its survival. This control allows the authorities to manage what stories apprise the Russian 
minority in Belarus, and limits the possibility for Russia to instigate and fuel turmoil. 
Estonia 
Estonia is one of the EU member states most poised to react aggressively towards Russia, stating 
that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are unacceptable and the EU should be “ready for war” 
(Euractiv, 2015). Estonia is worried that Russia might execute a deniable intervention on its soil 
as well. However, Estonian membership of the EU and NATO serve as deterrence to any 
intervention, and Russia would have nothing to gain by such a policy. For Tallinn the most 
worrisome factor is the dominance of Russian media in informing the large Russian minority in 
Estonia. The contemporary war rhetoric in Estonian politics benefits these media. 
Estonian-Russian relationship 
After the successful Singing Revolution at the end of the 1980s, Estonia was determined to 
become part of the Western and European community in the ensuing years. Such plans were 
undesirable in the eyes of Moscow; Estonia, as well as the other Baltics, was considered part of 
Russia’s sphere of influence and an essential buffer zone against the military threat of NATO. It 
therefore became Russia’s political objective “to deter Estonia from integrating with the West” 
(Bieliszczuk, 2015). Using all methods at hand, including military threats, sanctions, and 
manipulation of the Russian minority in Estonia, Moscow tried to keep Tallinn part of Russia’s 
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ambit, ultimately without any success (ibid.). In 1996, Estonia refused to become part of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. A year later, it started talks about accession to the EU 
(Aalto, 2003, p. 576). At the end of the century, it became apparent to Moscow that Estonia’s 
membership to NATO was inevitable. The objective was changed from deterring Estonia to 
becoming a member of the West to pushing NATO to reform its military programme (ibid.). 
Estonia became a full member of the EU and of NATO in 2004, joined the Schengen area in 
2007, and became a member of the Eurozone in 2011 (EU, 2015). 
  However, the realization that the accession of Estonia to the West was inevitable did not 
mean Russian policymakers simply accepted the loss influence. While some scholars argue that 
national identity in Russia became ‘desecuritized’ in the first years of the new century (Morozov, 
2004, p. 317), which led to improvements in the relationship between the Baltic states and 
Russia, increasingly powerful hard-edged realist policymakers, categorized by Andrew Kuchins 
and Igor Zevelev (2011) as ‘great power balancers’ (p.153), began to take center stage in 
Moscow at the same time. These policymakers did not plan to ‘desecuritize’ the relationships 
vis-à-vis the Baltics.  Instead, they started actively ‘testing’ the post-enlargement situation by 
raising concerns about the ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltic States. This coincided with 
increased cooperation between Russia and the EU and the US in the global War on Terror (see 
Made, 2005, p. 103). One could argue, therefore, that security has always been the leading lens 
through which the Baltics and Russia look at each other.
12
  
  Such dynamics were amplified in 2008, when conflict erupted between Russia and 
Georgia. The Russian-Georgian War of 2008 could be considered, until the intervention in 
Ukraine in 2014, the pinnacle of the great power balancers in the Kremlin, and marks a new 
chapter in the relationship between the West and Russia. Concerns raised by Estonia, among 
others, about the threat of Moscow became more eminent in this relationship. The seriousness of 
the threat was underlined by the war games Russia conducted in 2009, with scenarios in which 
terrorists from the Baltics attacked the enclave of Kaliningrad and three NATO-like brigades, 
including one Estonian, invaded western Russia (Economist, 2009). 
  Since 2008, the relationship between Estonia and Russia has become increasingly hostile. 
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 Another important issue has been energy. Since gaining independence Estonia and other Baltic States were reliant 
on Russian oil and gas supplies. In recent years these states have tried to diversify their supply by building liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) terminals in order to bypass the gas pipe infrastructure. Estonia has approved plans to build a 
LNG terminal in the Port of Tallinn (New Europe Investor, 2014). Latvia has similar plans.  
23 
 
Russia has raised concerns about the Russian minority living in Estonia on numerous occasions. 
Furthermore, a copious amount of cyber-attacks have allegedly been carried out by Russia on 
Estonia. The Russian air force has continuously violated Estonian air space, with a spike in 
incidents in 2014 (Bieliszcuk, 2015). These violations are especially worrisome for Estonia 
considering Tallinn does not possess air combat capabilities and thus relies in NATO partners. 
   The relationship with Russia hit a new low in 2014 when Russia abducted an Estonian 
intelligence officer who was posted near the border (Guardian, 2014). The officer was paraded 
on Russian national television as a spy two days after US president Barack Obama visited 
Estonia (ibid.). In August 2015, the man was sentenced to 15 years in prison, but a month later 
an exchange deal was made in which the officer was traded for a convicted Russian spy serving 
time in Estonia (Guardian, 2015; ERR, 2015).  
  However, despite all these incidents and the general hostile relationship, Russia does not 
have a direct incentive to carry out a deniable intervention in Estonia, simply because it will not 
gain anything by such a policy. Estonia is firmly placed in and committed to Western and 
European security frameworks. It is unlikely that, apart from the most stubborn hardliners, 
Russian policymakers still consider Estonia a part of the Russian sphere of influence. As 
mentioned, the key issue that prompted Russia to intervene in Ukraine was the transition it was 
trying to make from a generally pro-Russia policy to a pro-Europe policy. Estonia made that 
transition two decades ago. In other words, Russia has already lost Estonia. 
  Furthermore, Estonia’s membership of NATO and the EU is likely to work as deterrence. 
The alliance has boosted its presence in Eastern Europe to reassure the Baltic States as well as to 
signal Moscow. While it is unclear if the same principles of collective defense apply when 
dealing with a deniable intervention (which is not an overt, interstate conflict), NATO shows that 
it will respond to any kind of violation of sovereignty in the Baltics. 
  Finally, membership of NATO and the EU also means that the goal of destabilization will 
not be easily reached. Other member states and Brussels will continue to support Estonia both 
politically and financially. The difficulty of destabilizing Estonia is amplified by the fact that 
Estonia is a well-functioning state with strong, national institutions (see section on state capacity 
below). It differs in this regard from post-Euromaidan Ukraine. In other words, there is not a 
turbulent situation that can be exploited by Russia. 
  In conclusion, Estonia has been moving towards the West since gaining independence in 
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the 1990s. Its relationship with Russia remains hostile, as exemplified by numerous incidents 
since 2008. There is, however, no direct incentive to intervene in Estonia, considering a) Russia 
would not gain anything by such a policy, and b) Estonia and its partners would be able to 
respond firmly. 
Estonian state capacity 
Of the four cases studied in this thesis, Estonia has the lowest score when it comes to state 
capacity. In 2011 it scored 0.773 in the RPC dataset. This score is consistent since the beginning 
of the century. The low score (in comparison to the other cases) does not mean that Estonia is a 
weak state or that its institutions are ineffective. It does mean that the Estonian state has a lower 
ability to appropriate funds from the national economy, which is typical of a democracy; civil 
society and citizens enjoy a stronger position against the state than counterparts in autocracies. 
To put the score in perspective: Estonia scores higher than both The Netherlands and the US. 
   For Estonia, building the right state institutions was a prerequisite to joining the EU. 
Every candidate state has to implement the acquis communautaire and bring the “domestic 
policies in line with EU standards” (Hille and Knill, 2006, p. 531). These EU standards provide 
for the construction of a strong, capable state that can uphold European law. As such, every EU 
member state, including Estonia and Latvia, has adequate state capacity. Furthermore, as Jessica 
Fortin (2012) argues: “effective state capacity seems to be a necessary—but not sufficient—
condition for democracy” (p. 904).13 Reversing this logic means that a well-performing 
democracy, such as Estonia, cannot but have effective state capacity. 
  Finally, a crucial characteristic is that, as a member of the EU, Estonia’s state capacity is 
not limited to its national borders. Being part of the community of European states means that 
Estonia can rely on other member states for support in the event it proves to be unable to extract 
the necessary resources. Greece after the financial crisis of 2008 is a prime example of this 
dynamic. Estonia thus has a safety net that reaches beyond its own territory. The flipside of this 
coin is, of course, that Estonia has to chip in if another member state requires help. 
  Again, a small caveat on this analysis is in order. While Estonia scores relatively low on 
the ability to extract resources from the national output, it does score very high on other possible 
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 Fortin (2012) uses a different definition of state capacity, namely one that focuses on the provision of public 
goods (p. 909) rather than the extraction from the national output. 
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indicators of state capacity. According to Jessica Fortin (2010), Estonia has one of the highest 
scores in the post-Soviet space when it comes to property rights enforcement and lack of 
corruption (p. 662 and p. 668; TI, 2014), which are typical and crucial priorities in a liberal 
democracy with a well-functioning market economy (compare with Belarus).
14
 
  While Estonia scores lower on state capacity than Belarus, it is still very capable of 
extracting resources from the national output. Furthermore, it has, as a prerequisite to 
membership of the EU, strengthened its state institutions prior to accession in 2004. Unlike 
Ukraine, Estonia is not facing any turmoil that reduces state capacity. In short, Estonia, 
embedded in European institutions, has the capacity to react and resist in case of a deniable 
intervention.  
Ethnic Russians in Estonia 
According to the Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 2015, approximately 25 percent of the Estonian 
population is of Russian ethnicity (ESA, 2015, p. 60). This means that there are around 330.000 
Russians living in Estonia, which makes ethnic Russians the largest minority. In comparison: 
Estonians make up around 69 percent of the population, and Ukrainians, the second-largest 
minority, make up around 1.7 percent (ibid.). Similar to other Baltic states, the total population 
of Estonia has been in decline since 1989. Between 1989 and 2015, the population of Estonia 
decreased 17 percent. In the same time period the relative size of ethnic Russians in Estonia has 
declined as well with approximately 5 percent (ibid.). In short, Russians are still the largest 
minority in Estonia, but their relative and absolute numbers have been decreasing. 
  The Russian minority is geographically concentrated in two areas of the country: the 
capital and largest city, Talinn, and the cities of Sillamäe and Narva, both located in the most 
north-eastern corner of Estonia in the Ida-Viru County (MAR, 2015b). As mentioned, 
geographical concentration is a potential risk factor, because it increases the possibilities for 
organization and gaining the upper hand in a specific region. The fact that the region of Ida-Viru 
County borders Russia increases the risk in the case of Estonia. 
  In 2011, sociologist Marju Lauristin conducted a study on the Russian minority of 
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 But not the most critical state functions when dealing with a deniable intervention, despite Fortin’s assertion that 
“a state that is sufﬁciently capable of enforcing property rights is also technically strong enough to conﬁscate wealth 
and property” (2010, p. 662). Extraction and protection require vastly different institutions that cannot be changed 
overnight when facing a security threat. 
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Estonia and found that “the Russian-speaking population is split into two: approximately half are 
successfully integrated, the rest much less or almost not at all” (Koort, 2014). The lack of 
integration is at least partially explained by the legislature that was adopted by the Estonian 
authorities after regaining independence in the 1990s (see Pettai & Hallik, 2002, p. 513). Many 
of the Russians living in Estonia do not fulfill the requirements to be considering a citizen. In 
2006, approximately “60 percent of the Russian population were non-Estonian citizens (40 
percent were stateless and 20 percent were citizens of Russia) [sic]” (MAR, 2015b). Moreover, 
language requirements have barred many Russians from having the same economic opportunities 
as Estonians, as well as limiting educational attainment (Lindemann & Saar, 2012). In the last 
few decades, Russians in Estonia have thus experienced disadvantages and setbacks. 
  This, however, has not led the ethnic Russians to rebel against the Estonian government. 
According to MAR, “the likelihood of rebellion is small, [but] the likelihood of protest by the 
group remains significant” (MAR, 2015b). There have been small protests in March and April 
2014 in Tallinn by pro-Russia groups, such as ‘Russians in Estonia’, but these protests were 
attended by few people, mostly pensioners (Stratfor, 2014c). Some of the protests were held to 
show support for Russian involvement in Crimea (ibid.). The marginal role of these protests can 
be partially explained by the lack of homogeneity in the Russian minority, which impedes the 
creation of strong political organizations and makes “the possibility of organized ethnic strife 
unlikely” (MAR, 2015b). In other words, only part of the Russian minority in Estonia is focused 
on its relationship with Russia, while another part is focused mainly on Estonia itself. 
  Despite the lack of homogeneity, existing grievances about language and citizenship 
could be exploited by Russia if it deems it necessary to destabilize Estonia. Moreover, the anti-
Russian political current, which came into effect in response to the Ukraine crisis, could lead to 
further polarization by demonizing the Russians living in Estonia. This could alienate the 
Russians that until now have focused on being a productive member of Estonian society. 
  Estonia thus has a large Russian minority that is geographically concentrated in Tallinn 
and the Ida-Viru County. The minority has existing grievances as a result of harsh citizenship 
and language laws that were adopted in the 1990s. These grievances could potentially form a 
source for Russia to exploit. Moreover, the anti-Russian political current in contemporary 
Estonia could also turn out to be a dividing factor. So far, however, support for pro-Russia 
campaigns has been limited. 
27 
 
Pro-Kremlin media in Estonia 
Estonia has been one of the first states to understand the hazards of Russia’s propaganda through 
the use of biased and often state-controlled media. In recent years, the Estonian government has 
been working on the creation of a public Russian-language television channel to counter the 
narratives presented by the biased pro-Kremlin channels (Stratfor, 2014b). Such a public channel 
has become a necessity given that a big chunk of the Estonian population lives “in a separate 
reality created by Russian media and NGO’s” (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 24).  
  Language is one of the key factors in explaining this division. According to the EJC, 
Estonians prefer to watch domestic programmes in Estonian, whereas the Russian population of 
Estonia rather watches programmes in Russian, often broadcasted from Russia (EJC, 2015b). 
There is little to no interchanging between the two, for example through the use of subtitles. A 
difference is also present when it comes to types of media consumed: “There are significantly 
fewer readers of newspapers and magazines among the Russian-speaking population compared 
to Estonian readers” (Pelnēns, 2010, p. 92). Given that they almost exclusively watch Russia’s 
television channels, the information the Russian minority receives is very limited. 
.  One of the most popular television channels among Russians in Estonia is PBK (Первый 
Балтийский канал; First Baltic Channel), “a Russian-language television channel that has 4 
million viewers in the region and receives low-cost, high-quality Russian programming and news 
from state Russian TV” (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 24). For the Russian minority, news 
coming from Russia, such as on PBK, is also more trustworthy than the Estonian media outlets 
(Pelnēns, 2010, p. 95). PBK is thus popular and trusted among the Russian population of Estonia. 
 The link between PBK and the Kremlin is rather obvious. The channel is a scion of 
Russia’s Channel One (Первый канал), the first television channel of Russia and controlled by 
the Russian state. Channel One is one of the key components of the Kremlin’s media strategy. 
  Apart from offering a different narrative of regional and world events compared to 
international media, the Russian media in Estonia have also been accused of instigating the mass 
riots surrounding the relocation of a Soviet memorial statue, the Bronze Soldier, in 2007 
(Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 24). Commentators also note that the Russian media in Estonia 
have very close relations with the Centre Party, which favors close relations with Moscow and is, 
unsurprisingly, the most popular party among ethnic Russians (Satter, 2014, p. 16; FT, 2015). 
  As mentioned, Estonia recognizes the effects the Russian media has on a large part of its 
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population. In October 2015, it therefore launched ETV+, “a new public television station 
broadcasting in Russian only” (DW, 2015). ETV+ is one of the most prominent initiatives on the 
continent to regain influence on the Russian-speaking parts of the population and to offer them 
different narratives as opposed to the ones provided by Russian media.  
  Estonia is also one of the member states of the EU pushing for more European initiatives 
to counter what is often called the Russian disinformation campaign. One such initiative is the 
‘Disinformation Review’ by the EU task force StratCom East, “a weekly publication, which 
collects as many examples of the Russian disinformation attacks as possible (…) [with the 
objective to] show the European public the high amount of such disinformation attacks that 
target European audience every single day, to expose the number of countries targeted, and, thus, 
to explain to the European audience the breadth of this problem” (EEAS, 2015). Countering 
Russian disinformation is becoming one of the key objectives in EU policy towards Russia.  
  Estonia thus has a societal division when it comes to media use, with the ethnic Russian 
population almost exclusively relying on Russian, often state backed, media. These media offer a 
different narrative in comparison to their Estonian and international counterparts. The Estonian 
government, however, has recognized this problem, and has been developing counter initiatives 
on the national and European level. 
Latvia 
Latvia has been one of the most hawkish states when it comes to countering Russian aggression, 
for example by requesting the permanent deployment of thousands of NATO troops on its 
territory (Washington Times, 2015). Latvia scores fairly similar to Estonia, particularly when it 
comes to international institutions that work as deterrence and the dominant position of Russian 
media in informing the Russian minority in Latvia. In contrast to Estonia, however, Latvia has 
not developed any significant, national initiatives to counter these media.  
Latvian-Russian relations 
Many of the events and issues mentioned in the section dealing with Estonia similarly apply to 
Latvia. After Latvia regained independence in the 1990s, it decided to align itself firmly with the 
West. This alignment was finalized in 2004, when Latvia became a member of the EU and of 
NATO (in the organization’s fifth enlargement) – to Russia’s discord. According to Rasma 
Kārklina and Imants Liegìs (2006), this moment was “a true watershed: being part of a larger 
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alliance meant that power relations between Latvia and the Russian Federation became less 
asymmetrical, and bilateral relations were de-emphasized in favour of a larger multilateral ﬁeld 
of interactions” (p. 148). Apart from the membership of EU and NATO, some of the other 
dynamics mentioned in the case of Estonia also apply to Latvia: Russia’s concerns about the 
Russian minority in Latvia (see below), energy dependence, and increasingly hostile behavior. 
  Air space violations are a major expression of hostile behavior against Latvia and the 
other Baltic States. The European Leadership Network (ELN) has compiled a list of such 
incidents between March 2014 and March 2015 (see ELN, 2015). Most incidents happen in the 
Baltic region. In December 2014, for example, six Russian military bombers flew over the Baltic 
Sea near the maritime border of Latvia (Bloomberg, 2014b). These bombers were intercepted by 
NATO fighter jets stationed in Latvia. Two months earlier Russia conducted large-scale training 
exercises in the region that put NATO on high alert (ELN, 2015). But despite these incidents, 
there has not been any real risk of escalation. 
  Unsurprisingly, the conclusions for Estonia can be drawn in the case of Latvia as well. 
There is no real incentive to destabilize Latvia, considering it is firmly placed in Western 
political and military frameworks, which would also work as deterrence against any intervention. 
Despite continuous hostile behavior from Russia towards Latvia, ultimately there is no 
geopolitical gain to accomplish by carrying out a deniable intervention. 
Latvian state capacity 
According to the RPC dataset, in 2011 Latvia had a score of 1.032 in terms of state capacity. 
This is slightly lower than the scores of Belarus and Kazakhstan, but significantly higher than the 
score of Estonia. Since 2006 this score has been steadily declining, presumably because of 
changes in tax legislature that have been implemented from 2006 onwards. This means that 
Latvia has been decreasing the state’s ability to extract resources from the national output and 
increasing the position of both civil society and private citizens vis-à-vis the state. Estonia’s 
score is similar to, for example, the scores of France and Iceland. 
  Again some of the same arguments that applied to Estonia are suitable for Latvia as well. 
Prior to its membership of the EU it needed to implement the acquis communautaire, which in 
effect builds a suitable state capacity needed to uphold law and be able to function as a 
democracy. As a member of the EU, Latvia enjoys state capacity beyond its own territory. If it 
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faces budgetary or other types of problems, it can rely on other member states for help. Ukraine 
on the other hand did not have such a safety net, meaning that it had to rely on the benevolence 
of international institutions and private investors to get the necessary loans. 
  While Latvia scores relatively high on the ability to extract resources from the national 
output, its’ scores on other measures of state capacity are worse. The level of corruption in 
Latvia is higher than in its northern neighbor (Forlin, 2010, p. 668). According to the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Latvia is one of the lowest scoring EU 
member states (low score equals a high level of perceived corruption) (TI, 2014). This score, 
however, is still significantly better than that of Belarus and Kazakhstan. As mentioned, 
corruption diminishes state capacity by reducing the total amount of revenue a state receives, 
which makes it less able to perform all necessary state functions. Latvia also scores relatively 
low when it comes to enforcing property rights; an issue on which Estonia scores very high.  
 In conclusion, Latvia exhibits signs of a high state capacity. It is also embedded in the 
European transnational framework. Furthermore, it does not face any turmoil that would reduce 
state capacity. In all, Latvian state capacity is not a factor that would negatively affect Latvia’s 
overall ability to react to a deniable intervention. 
Ethnic Russians in Latvia 
The latest census in Latvia (2011) shows that approximately 27 percent of the Latvian population 
is of Russian ethnicity (CSP, 2012). This constitutes roughly half a million people. People of 
Latvian ethnicity make up about 62 percent of the population. This means that Russians are by-
far the largest minority in Latvia. In the previous census (2000) Russians made up almost 30 
percent of the Latvian population (ibid.). The decline in percentage of ethnic Russians between 
2000 and 2011 was larger than the shrinkage of the general population in that period (ibid). Since 
the census in 2011 this decline has continued (see table 2). Similar to Estonia, Russians thus still 
form the largest minority in Latvia, yet the relative size of this minority has been in a downfall 
the last decade and a half. 
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Table 2. The percentage of ethnic Russians in Latvia (2011-2015) 
 % 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Russians 26.8 26.5 26.2 26.0 25.8 
Source:  CSP, 2015 
According to data from MAR, most of the Russians in Latvia live in large urban areas. 
The 2011 census shows that in the capital and largest city, Riga, Russians form approximately 37 
percent of the population (twelve percentage points smaller than Latvians). Russians form the 
majority in several large cities, most notably in the second largest city of Latvia, Daugavpils. 
This city is also the regional capital of the Latgale region in the east of Latvia. This region 
directly borders Russia.  
  In the 1990s, the ethnic Russians that stayed in Latvia after it regained its independence 
were confronted with increasingly hostile legislation as part of the process of reclaiming 
sovereignty. Michele Commercio (2004) states that Latvia implemented “exceptionally 
antagonistic nationalization policies” that negatively affected the Russian minority (p. 23). The 
Citizenship Law, for example, barred many Russians from political participation, including 
voting and holding state-sector jobs, because they could not obtain citizenship (MAR, 2015a). 
The Language Law obliged all minority schools to instruct in Latvian at least 60 percent of the 
time (ibid.). In 2012, a referendum was held with the question if Russian should become the 
second official language in Latvia. Almost 75 percent voted against such a constitutional reform. 
However, one could question the validity of such a referendum when a large part of those that 
would presumably vote in favor – namely the Russian minority – cannot vote because of a lack 
of citizenship.
15
   
  According to data from MAR, there is little risk of ethnic Russian rebellion in Latvia, 
despite “persistent protest and government repression in the form of restrictions on their ability 
to engage in public demonstrations” (MAR, 2015a). Protests have been held mainly in the 
Latgale region and there have been reports of pro-Russian activists campaigning for the 
secession of Latgale from Latvia to join Russia (Stratfor, 2014a). So far, these actions have been 
small and sporadic, which indicates that most Russians in Latvia are not supportive of such 
campaigns. This is also exemplified by the creation of the NGO European Russians in Latvia, 
                                                             
15
 The same harsh, nationalization policies were implemented in Estonia. The third Baltic state, Lithuania, however, 
approached its Russian minority with a more benign policy that allowed it to better integrate into society (see Best, 
2013, p. 39).  
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whose goal is “to counterbalance the most radical members of the Russian minorities in the 
country and support Latvia's orientation toward the West” (Stratfor, 2014b).  
  Similar to the case of Estonia, the existing grievances in Latvia could be exploited by 
Russia if it deems it necessary to destabilize Latvia. The anti-Russian political current in Estonia 
is also present in Latvia and could lead to further polarization. Some Russians in Latvia state that 
there is a ‘war hysteria’ going on in Latvia that diverts attention from more urgent matters and 
fuels ethnic conflict between the Latvian and Russian populations in Latvia (e.g. VPRO, 2015). 
It is therefore imperative for the Latvian authorities to distinguish between Russians in Russia 
and Russians in Latvia, and to appease the latter group by involving them in the political 
processes of the state and by removing obstacles to full membership of society. 
  Latvia thus has a large ethnic Russian minority that is mostly located in the western 
region of Latgale. Since the 1990s, this minority has not been fully incorporated in Latvian 
society, which has given way to grievances that could be exploited. The anti-Russian political 
current in contemporary Latvia could also fuel these grievances. So far, however, support for 
pro-Russia campaigns has been limited. 
Pro-Kremlin media in Latvia 
In Latvia, the abovementioned PBK, a scion of the Kremlin-controlled Channel One, is the 
second most-watched television channel in the country (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 24). 
This is highly problematic, not in the last place because Russian television channels consistently 
call Latvians fascists on account of their massive collaboration with the Nazis during World War 
II (whom were viewed as liberators because of the Soviet occupation; see VPRO, 2015). Ethnic 
Russians living in Latvia, who rely on Russian media,
16
 are thereby pitted against their 
compatriots. This has prompted the Latvian authorities to temporarily ban Russian television 
broadcasts in the past, for example in April 2014, for “security reasons” (Stratfor, 2014b).17 
  The prominence of PBK is also problematic due to the perception among ethnic Russians 
in Latvia that PBK’s information is the most objective of all channels available (Pelnēns, 2010, 
p. 184). This makes it difficult for other media outlets to compete, which is amplified by the 
                                                             
16
 Ethnic Russians in Latvia “watch more television and read fewer printed media than ethnic Latvians, (…) [and] 
have comparatively less trust in printed media (…) (Pelnēns, 2010, pp. 183-184) 
17
 One of the television channels that was banned was state-owned Rossiya RTR (RTR Latvia), which was accused 
of disseminating ‘war propaganda’ (Freedom House, 2015c).  
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advantages PBK has as a subsidiary of Channel One, such as the lack of need for the creation of 
own content. According to Satter (2014, p. 17), PBK gets seventy percent of its content from its 
mother company. This frees up financial capacity for other activities, such as marketing. 
  The most stunning event showing the prominence and influence of PBK was the election 
of Nils Usakovs, former news director of PBK, as mayor of Riga in 2011.  Before joining PBK, 
Usakovs was head of the Latvian branch of the official Russian news agency, ITAR-TASS 
(Pelnēns, 2010, p. 186). Satter (2014) argues that “Usakovs was depicted by PBK prior to the 
elections as the savior of the Russian-speaking community” (p. 17). Usakovs is the leader of the 
Harmony Center, “the largest party advocating the rights of Latvia’s ethnic Russian minority” 
(New York Times, 2014).  The political connection between PBK and Usakovs and the 
monopoly the channel has when it comes to informing the ethnic Russians in Latvia creates an 
environment that is not in accordance with Western media standards. 
  Furthermore, as Pelnēns (2010, p. 186) shows, Usakovs is not the only politician in 
Latvia with roots in media owned or controlled by the Russian state. Numerous members of 
Harmony Center have previously worked for Russian television companies, which is all the more 
worrisome given that some of them occupy positions on committees meant to oversee good 
broadcasting practices. Unsurprisingly, there have been incidents that raised questions about 
censorship, such as the controversy in 2007 about the cancellation of a documentary critical of 
Putin (Baltic Times, 2007; see also Wikileaks, 2007). 
  Finally, the Kremlin also has a strong position in Latvia when it comes to printed media. 
The most important Russian language newspapers in Latvia, such as Vesti Segodnja, Chas, and 
Telegraf, are all owned by Russian oligarchs - who also happen to be senators (Satter, 2014, p. 
17; also EJC, 2015c). These oligarchs are thus well-connected with ties to the Russian political 
power center, which, again, raises questions about media standards. In short, the available media 
in Russian in Latvia is all but dominated by the Russian state and its political elite.  
  Latvia is not as advanced as Estonia in offering alternatives to the Russian state backed 
media. It is, however, championing a European strategy towards the Russian disinformation 
campaign. In April 2015, a year after Latvia temporarily banned Russian channels, a proposal for 
a “Russian-language TV service to counter Kremlin propaganda received overarching support” 
from EU member states during summits in Riga (Al-Jazeera, 2015). Latvian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Edgars Rinkēvičs, stated earlier that he wanted “to invest jointly in alternative sources of 
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information — not alternative propaganda sources, but an alternative normal European TV 
channel, with entertainment, with news, but with very factually accurate news” (Buzzfeed, 
2014). Similar to Estonia’s national initiatives, the goal seems to be engaging the Russian part of 
the population, to include them in the Latvian society, as opposed to the current segmentation. So 
far, however, the European initiative has not produced anything substantial.  
  In conclusion, Latvia has a societal division when it comes to media use. The Russian 
state and political elite have a near monopoly on providing news to the Russians in Latvia, and 
have translated that position, to some degree, into political influence. Latvia has been 
championing a European approach to this problem, which is still in its early stages. 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed understanding for Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
(Reuters, 2014). Yet it is unlikely that his regime is not at all worried by it. While Kazakhstan 
and Russia maintain good relationships, the former has been moving slowly towards better 
relations with China. There is also the issue of the large Russian minority in the north that has 
expressed grievances in the past and is under influence of Russian media. 
Kazakhstan-Russia relations 
Kazakhstan is arguably one of Russia’s closest allies in Central-Asia. It is a member of most if 
not all post-Soviet regional organizations constituted to fill the gaps left by the Soviets, including 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union, as well 
as of Eurasian cooperation initiatives, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Unlike 
Belarus, which has accepted membership of regional organizations primarily to gain economic 
benignity from Russia, Kazakhstan did not have to be wooed by the Russians. Its president, 
Nazarbayev, is a proponent of regional cooperation and has “been the most supportive of all the 
integrationist programs” (Saivetz, 2012, p. 410). As such, Kazakhstan has advocated close 
relations with Russia since the end of the Soviet-Union. 
  Whereas Belarus’ relation with Russia is to a large degree determined by energy 
dependency and economic concerns, Kazakhstan, due to its own large energy reserves and its ties 
to China, has viewed its relation with Russia predominantly from a political-military perspective. 
Kazakhstan is one of many Central-Asian states that houses Russian military forces on its 
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territory and it tends to buy Russian missile and artillery technology (Way, 2015, p. 693). Roger 
McDermott (2012) argues that “legal and doctrinal issues serve to bind Kazakhstan and Russia in 
this enduring defence partnership” (p. 78). The CSTO has also become more active in recent 
years through the conduction of numerous military exercises in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
as well as by reviving “military cooperation between Russia and the individual state’s military 
industrial complexes, particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan” (Saivetz, 2012, p. 
403). Russia therefore remains the most important strategic partner of Kazakhstan. 
  However, in recent years Astana has been looking to diversify its international defense 
cooperation, which is possible because of the unexclusive nature of the partnership with Moscow 
(McDermott, 2012, p. 78). Similar to other Central-Asian states, Kazakhstan is a member of 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace since 1995, although this membership has remained largely 
symbolic (Spechler & Spechler, 2012, p. 2).Due to its geographical location, Kazakhstan did not 
play as active a role as other Central-Asian states during and after the War in Afghanistan (2001-
2014), although it did allow NATO to transfer some of its non-lethal equipment to Afghanistan 
by rail (NATO, 2015c). The last few years NATO-Kazakh cooperation has simmered at best.  
  The relationship between Kazakhstan and China is presumably more worrisome to 
Russia. For the moment this relationship is, in line with China’s general foreign policy, mostly 
economic in nature. China has shown a great interest in Kazakh natural gas and oil reserves; as 
of 2012, “China’s state-owned National Petroleum Company produces a fifth of all Kazakhstan’s 
oil output” (Spechler & Spechler, 2012, p. 7). While Russian companies still have a dominant 
position in the Kazakh energy sector, China has become a major competitor. In 2013, for 
example, it invested almost double the amount of money in the Kazakh economy as Russia. 
China also offers extensive loans and rebuilds vital infrastructure, the latter presumably with 
eyes on the ‘New Silk Road’ project (see Guschin, 2015; Economist, 2015).  
  Russia’s concern over the growing importance of China for Kazakhstan is arguably 
twofold. First, Russia is concerned that projects such as the ‘New Silk Road’ will rival Russian 
integrationist projects, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, or even make them obsolete.  
Second, the possibility exists that China will extend its support to the political-military domain, 
thereby rivalling the extensive defense partnership Russia maintains with Kazakhstan at the 
moment. While Russia intervened in Ukraine because of the growing role of the EU and NATO, 
an intervention in Kazakhstan is most likely to be suggested by the growing role of China. 
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  Having said that, at the moment Kazakhstan is still firmly in the Russian sphere of 
influence. Kazakhstan’s multifaceted foreign policy and its (limited) approaches to China do not 
threaten this dominant position. Furthermore, Nazarbayev is considered a close friend of Russia, 
although he expressed concerns after the Russian invasion in Georgia about the use of military 
solutions to work out interethnic issues and the effect of these on the fundamental principle of 
territorial integrity (Spechler & Spechler, 2012, p. 2).  
  Because of this dominant position and close relationship with the Kazakh regime, there is 
no geopolitical incentive for Russia to intervene in Kazakhstan. But, in a dynamic similar to the 
one discussed in the section on Belarus, if Nazarbayev is removed from power and a less pro-
Russian regime is established, Russia might not hesitate to preserve its current relationship with 
Kazakhstan, and make sure that China’s role will not grow at the expense of that of Russia.   
Kazakh state capacity 
According to the RPC dataset, Kazakhstan had a score of 1.357 in 2011, which is the highest 
score of all four cases researched in this study. This score has slowly but significantly increased 
since 2008 (0.854), which indicates that the Kazakh state has improved its capability to extract 
resources from the national output. This is to a large degree due to the relative size of the gas- 
and oil industries, which make up most of the national output and are under extensive state 
control. Kazakhstan has therefore often been described as a ‘rentier state’ (Franke et al, 2009, p. 
110). This is further amplified by the low priority tax revenue has for the Kazakh regime; 
extraction of resources from the national output occurs directly through state control of large 
portions of the economy, rather than indirectly through taxation (Forlin, 2010, p. 668).  
  Furthermore, Kazakhstan has an authoritarian political regime, which means that the 
same arguments mentioned in the case of Belarus – less concerned with legitimizing policies, 
more resources spend on security – also apply to Kazakhstan. An authoritarian regime is able to 
increase state capacity at the expense of civil society and citizens without the latter two being 
able to object to certain policies and/or priorities. 
  As often is the case with rentier states, Kazakhstan does exhibit high levels of corruption. 
This decreases state capacity by lowering state income. Kazakhstan exhibits the main features of 
a neopatrimonial system as put forth by Oleksandr Fisun (2012, p. 91), meaning there is a group 
of actors around president Nazarbayev seeking rent, which is often a premise for widespread 
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corruption.
18
 Kazakhstan is in the same range of corruption as notoriously corrupt states such as 
Ukraine and Russia (TI, 2014). It also scores very low when it comes to enforcing private 
property rights, which, as stated, is not a priority for authoritarian regimes (Fortin, 2010, p. 668). 
Finally, unlike the previous two cases, Kazakhstan does not have a safety net provided by 
membership of a multilateral organization such as the EU. 
  Kazakhstan thus exhibits a high level of state capacity, which it derives primarily from 
extensive state control in the energy sector. At the moment this state capacity is not being 
undermined by any political turmoil (although Nazarbayev’s succession might prove to be 
negative factor in the near future). I therefore conclude that Kazakh state capacity is not a factor 
that would negatively affect Kazakhstan’s overall ability to react to a deniable intervention. 
Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan 
According to the latest census, held in 2009, there are 3.8 million ethnic Russians living in 
Kazakhstan, which constitutes approximately 23.7 percent of the total population (ASRK, 2011, 
p. 21). This means that Russians are the largest minority in Kazakhstan, well in front of the 
Uzbeks (3 percent). Kazakhs themselves make up 63 percent of the population (ibid.). Compared 
to the previous census in 1999, in which 4.5 million people identified themselves as ethnic 
Russian, the Russian population has decreased 15 percent, despite a general population increase 
of 7 percent. Furthermore, the relative size of the Russian minority in the Kazakh population also 
declined in this time period. In 1999 almost 30 percent of the total population of Kazakhstan was 
considered ethnic Russian (ibid.). The ethnic Russian minority of Kazakhstan is thus on a 
downward slope, declining rapidly in both absolute and relative numbers. 
  Not surprisingly, most ethnic Russians are located in the northern part of Kazakhstan in 
the regions that directly border Russia. They are thus regionally concentrated and, according to 
data from MAR, “show high levels of group cohesion” (MAR, 2015d). Many of the Russians in 
Kazakhstan live in and around the northern cities of Petropavl and Kostanay, as well as in and 
around north-eastern cities such as Pavlodar (see Washington Post, 2014). The former capital of 
Kazakhstan, Almaty, also harbors a large Russian minority, with about 33 percent of the cities’ 
population of Russian ethnicity (Primeminister.kz, 2015).
19
  
                                                             
18
 The fact that Kazakhstan has a neopatrimonial political system also raises questions about the extent Kazakhstan’s 
state capacity is actually regime capacity rather than state capacity. 
19
 I was unable to find reliable information on the number of ethnic Russians in the capital of Astana.  
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 Similar to other former Soviet states, Kazakhstan embarked on a path of nationalization 
once it regained independence in the 1990s. Nationalization included “promotion of ethnic 
Kazakhs in the government bureaucracy and promotion of Kazakh language education” (MAR, 
2015d). But nationalization did not just mean increasing Kazakh presence. It also meant 
lessening the influence and power of the Russians living in Kazakhstan, which was done through 
“a transmigration of Kazakhs into Slav-dominated territories from other areas, close monitoring 
of the Russian opposition and tight control over the Russian media” (ibid.). The Russians that did 
not leave Kazakhstan after it gained independence tried to organize themselves politically in 
order to counter the nationalization – to various degrees of success (see Peyrouse, 2008, p. 108). 
Despite this effort, the nationalization policies have decreased the societal opportunities for the 
Russian minority, excluding them, for example, from the public sector (MAR, 2015d). 
  While in recent years there have not been any major protests from the Russian minority, 
“resentment does linger over the loss in status” (ibid.). The lack of protest can at least partially 
be explained by the restrictions imposed by the authoritarian regime. These restrictions make it 
difficult to surmise how deep the resentment goes and how common it is felt within the Russian 
minority. According to data from MAR, some Russians have “demanded autonomy for certain 
regions” while others have demanded “outright reunification with Russia”, most notably at the 
turn of the century (ibid.). Others, such as those located in the southern regions, do not share 
these ideas (ibid.). Nevertheless, resentment is still present and could prove to be fertile ground 
for future conflict. It is therefore imperative for Kazakhstan to include its Russian minority by 
granting it the same political and civil rights as ethnic Kazakhs. 
  Kazakhstan thus has a large Russian minority, which is concentrated in the northern and 
north-eastern parts of the country. Similar to the Baltic cases, Kazakhstan implemented harsh 
nationalization policies in the 1990s that gave rise to resentment and grievances that still linger 
today and could be exploited by the Russian authorities. There are no indications that such 
exploitation is currently taking place.  
Pro-Kremlin media in Kazakhstan 
Similar to Belarus, the media in Kazakhstan is considered ‘not free’ by the Freedom House, 
scoring only slightly better than Belarus: 85/100 (with 100 the lowest possible score) (Freedom 
House, 2015). This is also apparent in the 2015 World Press Freedom Index, in which 
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Kazakhstan is ranked 160th of 180 states (RSF, 2015). These low scores are the result of 
systematic prosecution of critical journalists and lack of a freedom of information law; all meant 
to bolster the Kazakh regime, which, according to the Freedom House (2015), “dominate[s] the 
media landscape” and uses the judicial branch to silence critical and independent media. 
  This dominance, however, has not translated into banning Russian media, despite laws 
meant to limit foreign-produced programming (see Freedom House, 2015). According to a report 
published in 2010, “88 percent of the Kazakh audience watches Russian television” (Satter, 
2010, p. 25). In Kazakhstan, “Russian state channels like Rossiya, NTV, and First Channel (…) 
enjoy huge popularity” (Lillis, 2014). This contrasts sharply with Kazakh output, which accounts 
“for only 6 percent of the media outlets in Kazakhstan” (ibid.).  
  An important reason why Russian media is so popular in Kazakhstan is that its’ output is 
of higher quality than the output of Kazakh media. Kazakh media cannot compete with the state-
backed Russian media, whom can rely on vast amounts of money flowing in from the Kremlin. 
Furthermore, the tight media control in Kazakhstan has made Kazakh media unattractive. 
Restrictions limit the content, with most stories about the good performance of president 
Nazarbayev and little about world events.  
  The popularity of Russian media is worrying Kazakh officials and pundits, with some 
even talking about ‘informational colonization’ (Melnichuk, 2015). While the effect of the 
popularity of Russian media on public opinion and beliefs seems to be well understood in 
Kazakhstan, very little is being done to counter it, which is odd given the priority the regime 
gives to controlling the media landscape. The Kazakh regime is poised to counter this dynamic 
by supporting Kazakh language media organizations and minimizing the influence of Russian 
media. So far, however, no meaningful initiatives have been developed. One explanation could 
be that Kazakhstan does not want to anger Russia by limiting the reach of pro-Kremlin media. 
  Kazakhstan thus shows a fairly similar picture compared to Belarus, with the regime 
exercising authority into the media domain, but ultimately unable to resist the content and 
information flowing from Russia. Both have not been able to develop meaningful alternatives. 
There is no data, however, that Kazakhstan actively manages Russian media in a manner similar 
to the Belarusian regime. 
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Conclusions 
In this thesis I have conceptualized what is often called hybrid warfare as a deniable 
intervention: a military intervention by a state using covert forces as well as local insurgents, 
which have been catechized through pro-Kremlin media, to destabilize an adversary state and 
allow the intervening state deniability of involvement. The goal of this thesis was to determine if 
such a deniable intervention could be replicated by Russia in other states and therefore 
constitutes a regional threat. Four conditions were identified as having an influence on the 
efficaciousness of a deniable intervention. Consequently an empirical analysis was made to 
ascertain the extent to which these conditions are present in four cases: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia 
and Kazakhstan. Table 3 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
Table 3. Summary of analysis 
 Belarus Estonia Latvia Kazakhstan 
Russia has a 
direct 
incentive to 
destabilize 
the targeted 
state 
NO, but … NO NO NO, but … 
Weak state 
capacity in 
targeted state 
1.287 (2011),  
high corruption 
0.773 (2011),  
EU safety net, 
low corruption 
1.032 (2011),  
EU safety net, 
low corruption 
1.357 (2011),  
high corruption 
Russian 
minorities in 
targeted state 
8% of population, 
no grievances, 
geographically 
dispersed 
25% of population,  
minor grievances, 
geographically 
concentrated 
26% of population, 
minor grievances, 
geographically 
concentrated 
24% of population, 
minor grievances, 
geographically 
concentrated 
Pro-Kremlin 
media in 
targeted state 
MEDIUM, 
state controls media, 
no counter 
initiatives 
HIGH, 
national  
and European  
counter initiatives 
HIGH, 
European  
counter initiatives  
HIGH,  
state controls media, 
no counter 
initiatives 
 
 
From this summary several inferences can be drawn. First, all four cases enjoy extensive state 
capacity. Unlike Ukraine, which was faced with political turmoil and the breakdown of central 
authority, none of these cases are currently experiencing internal disturbances, nor is there any 
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indication that this might change in the near future (although the succession of Lukashenko in 
Belarus and Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan might prove to be destabilizing). 
  Second, while all four cases contain a large Russian minority, there are differences in 
relative size and other characteristics. This condition is the least alarming for Belarus. Less than 
ten per cent of the population is Russian, which is geographically dispersed and has not exhibited 
any grievances. This contrasts with the other three cases. Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan all 
have a large Russian minority that constitutes approximately a fourth of the population. 
Furthermore, in all three cases this minority is geographically concentrated and has exhibited 
minor grievances in the past – both risk factors for a deniable intervention. 
  Third, all four cases are deeply penetrated by Russian media, with large percentages of 
the population relying solely on Russian content and information coming through Kremlin-
approved, and often Kremlin-managed, channels. Russian media in these cases offer a different 
narrative of events than international channels. They are also known to spread disinformation 
about and criticize local authorities. This position gives them, and through them the Kremlin, 
extensive political power. This is well understood in Estonia and Latvia. These states have been 
developing national and European initiatives to counter the influence of Russian media. Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, on the other hand, have not, which is somewhat odd given the importance their 
respective regimes give to controlling the media.    
  Fourth and finally, Russia does not seem to have an incentive to conduct a deniable 
intervention in any of the four cases. The goal of the deniable intervention in Ukraine was to 
destabilize a transitioning state that was opting for closer cooperation and possibly integration 
with the West. Estonia and Latvia have made that transition in the last two decades and are now 
firmly embedded in NATO and European institutions, which provide both deterrence and a 
safety net in case of external aggression.  
  Belarus and Kazakhstan have not made any meaningful attempt to make such a transition 
and there are no indications that they will attempt it in the near future. However, the close 
alignment of these states with Russia puts them at risk if they would decide to alter the 
alignment, either by opting for closer cooperation with the West (in the case of Belarus) or with 
China and/or other Asian states (in the case of Kazakhstan). Such a transition would mean a loss 
of influence for Russia, which is precisely what prompted the deniable intervention in Ukraine. 
In other words, Belarus and Kazakhstan are more at risk than Estonia and Latvia. 
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  On the whole, however, none of the cases seem to be at particular risk at the moment to 
having to endure a deniable intervention from Russia. Ukraine provided a unique situation for 
Russia to deploy such a military strategy and it would likely be difficult to replicate the strategy 
in other states within the region. The conditions that made the deniable intervention in Ukraine 
such a success are not present to the same degree in the cases analyzed in this thesis.  
   This does not mean that states do not have to worry about Russia’s recent behavior. The 
contempt Russia showed for international agreements and principles is a legit concern, not only 
for those in direct proximity, but for all states that value rule of law and territorial sovereignty. 
  Likewise, the control the Kremlin exercises over Russian-language media in the region is 
problematic. Initiatives to counter the worrisome media situation are gaining momentum, but 
more needs to be done both on the national and European level.  
  The analysis of the phenomenon of the deniable intervention shows that, while parts of it 
are conducted through military means, the ground conditions that create the right environment 
are rooted in politics and media. Without these conditions, any attempt to conduct a deniable 
intervention will be futile. As such, Europe should seek to answer Russian aggression in Ukraine 
primarily in these domains. That means that an approach focused on soft power and countering 
the Russian disinformation campaigns should take precedent over an approach of increasing 
military presence and muscle-flexing. Aggressive war rhetoric will only lead to alienating the 
ethnic Russian populations of the EU, thereby creating a condition for Russia to exploit.  
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